Making Peace by John March

The memorial will make no political statement regarding the war or its conduct. It will transcend those issues. The hope is that the creation of the memorial will begin a healing process, a reconciliation of the grievous divisions wrought by the war. Through the memorial both supporters and opponents of the war may find a common ground for recognizing the sacrifice, heroism, and loyalty which were also a part of the Vietnam experience.

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We owe a lot to the Harvard Business School. It's kind of the untold story.

Jan Scruggs, President, Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

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From the design competition handbook for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial
On November 13 of last year, seven years after the close of the Vietnam war, a memorial to the veterans of America's longest armed conflict was dedicated on the Mall in Washington, D.C. Lying on a two-acre site between the Lincoln Memorial and the Washington Monument, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial is an angled wall of polished black granite inscribed with the names of the nearly 58,000 Americans who died in Vietnam or who at the war's end were listed as prisoners of war or missing in action.

In form the memorial is a wide "V" set into the earth, its two arms meeting at the base of a shallow amphitheater. Only the face bearing the names is exposed; the back of the wall is set into the surrounding land. The effect is as if the earth had been cut open and partly cleared away, revealing one face of a wall erected in some earlier time and now meticulously restored.

Like the Vietnam war itself, the memorial has been a source of sometimes bitter controversy. While few Americans have questioned the need for a memorial, some critics have seen in the design an implicit political statement — an indictment, they argue, of the war itself, and an unwillingness to honor the heroism of those who served. The choice of black granite, the decision to place the memorial below ground level, and the mute listing of the names of the dead have all been cited by the memorial's critics as inappropriate.

The memorial's defenders, on the other hand, have found in these same elements qualities of greatness. In its spareness and simplicity, they say, the memorial is an eloquent summary of the final fact of war — that, rightly or wrongly, people give their lives. To remember the dead, and especially to remember them as individuals, they say, is to honor them.

Lost in the tide of public reaction — which often seems to end in debate not on the merits of the memorial, but on the merits of the war itself — has been the story of how the memorial came to be. Central to this story are four Harvard Business School graduates, each of whom played a key role in helping to erect the memorial. Three of these men are Vietnam veterans, and the fourth is a Vietnam-era veteran. All four attended the U.S. Military Academy at West Point before coming to the Business School, and all lost close friends in Vietnam. Of the numerous ties that bind them, their shared Business School experience is only one. Nonetheless, each is careful to note that his Business School training played an important part in helping to meet the various challenges — organizational, financial, and political — encountered in the memorial effort. Indeed, Jack Wheeler (MBA '69), chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, recently had this to say: "Without the Business School training and frame of reference we had, it's an open question whether this country would have ended up in 1982 with a memorial at all."

Wheeler's involvement with the memorial began in 1979, shortly after the effort was launched by Vietnam veteran Jan Scruggs, who had undertaken the project almost single-handed. Wheeler (who was then, as now, an attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission) and his wife were visiting her parents in South Carolina when he came across a newspaper story about Scruggs and the memorial effort. "The story said that Jan had held a press conference and announced that he was going to build a million dollar memorial in Washington," he remembers, "but after a month he had raised only $144.50."

Wheeler knew from his own experience the kinds of obstacles Scruggs faced. Several years before, he had initiated an effort of his own to erect a Vietnam memorial at West Point, where he had graduated in 1966. (Wheeler had later spent a year at the Army's logistics center at Long Binh, Vietnam.) That memorial, a simple arrangement consisting of a brass plaque together with five granite benches, was five years in the making. In his effort to organize the West Point classes from 1960 to 1969 to serve as donors of the memorial, Wheeler had encountered a series of procedural obstacles together with an unexpected amount of emotional resistance.

"By 1978 I began to realize that the reason it was taking us so long to get the memorial built at West Point was that the war and our experience in it were very hard things to look at," he says. "It was and still is much more comfortable for our country, and especially our generation, to act as though there had been no war or any radically formative event during the 1960s. We know intellectually that that's not true, but it's still much more comfortable to act that way."

Behind Wheeler's effort at West Point was a recurrent feeling that he had not yet properly acknowledged the loss of his close friend and West Point classmate Tommy Hayes, who had been killed in Vietnam. Whatever Jan Scruggs's reasons
The Southeast Asia Memorial (shown above) at West Point. As leader of the effort to build the West Point memorial, Jack Wheeler encountered resistance from several quarters. An unobtrusive design, he learned, was the key to acceptance.

Wheeler (second from left) and West Point-HBS colleagues Art Mosley and Dick Radez at Long Binh, Vietnam, in 1969. At far left is another Business School graduate, Doctor R. Grants (MBA '72).
for wanting to do something similar on a national scale, Wheeler recognized the impulse and believed that he could help.

"I called Jan up after I read the story and told him who I was," he continues. "We talked about some of the problems involved and what needed to be done. Jan had taken the one major asset he had, some land in West Virginia, and sold it to create the memorial corporation. He didn't have much of an organization at that point, but he had a powerful idea and that's really where it all starts."

After some more discussion, Wheeler offered to join Scruggs in the memorial effort — and Scruggs, understandably, was quick to accept. In turn, Wheeler enlisted the aid of two of his West Point- and Harvard Business School-trained friends, Richard Radez (MBA '69) and Arthur Mosley (MBA '68).

Like Wheeler, both Radez and Mosley had been stationed at Long Binh in 1969, Radez as a finance officer and Mosley as a captain in the Corps of Engineers. Also like Wheeler, both had subsequently left the Army to pursue other careers. Radez was by then working for the Office of Management and Budget, and Mosley had formed a commercial real estate firm in Washington, D.C.

Other people, of course, were also instrumental in the effort from the earliest days, most notably Robert Doubek, another Vietnam veteran, who served as the Fund's first executive director and later as the memorial's project director. In the course of an early reorganization, Scruggs was named the Fund's president, while Wheeler assumed the chairmanship.

At the time Wheeler and Scruggs joined forces, the form of the proposed memorial was still undecided. It was in dealing with this question, says Wheeler, that his West Point experience provided a key insight.

"That insight was this: to build a memorial to those who served — not to the war, but to those who served — in America in the 1980s required a landscaped solution," he states, "a solution that would be contemplative and reflective in character and which would preserve the basic use of the land.

"I knew that we would have to go to the Congress and to people in corporate America for support, and I knew their first question was going to be 'What are you thinking about in terms of a design?' This would be especially true if we succeeded in getting a site on the Mall, as we hoped to do. Whatever we built, it wouldn't be allowed to compete with what was already there."

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ith this in mind, Wheeler and the others set about establishing an organizational structure for the Fund, the memorial's governing body. An important consideration, he notes, was the fact that the organization would have only a limited life span. Their initial plan called for the memorial to be dedicated on Veterans Day, 1982 — as indeed it was. While planning for the group's ultimate demise, however, the Fund's leadership also had to allow room for more immediate growth.

"In addition," says Wheeler, "we had to operate things so that all key people could get a flow of information in what was always a very fluid situation. I found myself thinking, 'This is a relatively complex organization in a fluid situation, and there are models to consider — the ones Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch served up while I was at the Business School. I can remember when Art Mosley and I were discussing possible organizations early on, and during that process we were explicitly aware of what had been called 'Hobo' problems at the Business School — human behavior in organizations.'"

The task of leading the fund-raising effort fell to Radez, who would later leave OMB for the New York office of Barclays Bank International, where he now serves as a vice president. It was Radez who first realized that far more than one million dollars was needed. A more realistic figure, he calculated, would be seven million dollars. Convincing the others to accept this new figure was, he recalls, one of his biggest challenges — and for an obvious reason: "It made our job that much harder."

Radez, who eventually accepted a position on the corporation's board, recalls that when he first arrived the fund raising was being done in a well-meaning but haphazard fashion — a situation he determined to remedy, though he himself had no prior fund-raising experience. What was needed, he saw, was a master plan and a mechanism to implement it. After carrying out what he terms "market research" — a review of the literature devoted to fund raising by nonprofit corporations — he prepared an overall plan, which called for the hiring of a professional fundraiser, an outside fund-raising consultant to lend additional expertise, and a direct mail consultant.

"It was clear that direct mail would have to play a big role at the outset," he recalls. "Major donors
Dick Radez: “My feeling was, Let the names be the memorial, not some big building with white columns. Just let it be the names.”

want to see a drawing and plans, and at that point we didn’t have either. I realized, then, that we were going to have to rely on smaller donors at the outset.

“The problem with that, as I knew from my research, is that the typical direct mail effort is run as a loss leader to generate a membership base for future appeals. In our case, though, it was clear that there would be no future appeals, since we were not going to be an ongoing organization. This effort had to make a profit from the word go.”

Radez eventually found a direct mail firm that could appreciate the Fund’s special situation, and as it happened it was run by a Vietnam veteran, Ray Grace. Grace’s company had handled the direct mail campaign for the Winter Olympics at Lake Placid, and thus had experience working with an organization designed to complete its task and then disband.

Even to engage Grace’s firm, however, required the Fund to have a certain amount of money already in hand. In this regard, they were fortunate to receive several important contributions early in the campaign, among them a benefit breakfast hosted by Virginia Senator John Warner, who had served as Secretary of the Navy during part of the Vietnam War. Funds raised at this breakfast, together with other early gifts, enabled them to launch a major national campaign shortly thereafter.

Later in the course of the fund raising, substantial corporate donations were received as well. Of these, many of the most significant came from the oil industry, which Radez had targeted early as a potential source of major funding. The biggest single contribution, however, was a one million dollar gift from the American Legion, followed by a $250,000 contribution from the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Each of these, Radez notes, can be considered to represent thousands of individual contributions, since both the Legion and the VFW effectively served as a means of channeling individual contributions to the Fund. At the same time, many of the corporate contributions came in the form of matching gifts, which again build upon the contributions of individuals. The result, he believes, has been a memorial truly financed by the American people.

“I think the most incredible thing about this has been the emotional response it has evoked from people across the country,” he observes. “That, as much as anything else, explains why I’ve been involved.” Compelling evidence of this response lies in the thousands of letters received by the Fund in concert with the individual contributions. Brief and simple for the most part, they rarely fail to move even the casual reader. “Donated in memory of Marine Corps Pfc. Gary M. Dominique, killed in Vietnam May 14, 1970, near Da Nang,” says one, and nothing more. “I realize that my contribution is very small,” says another. “It’s all I could afford to give. I wanted to send something in honor of my childhood friend. . . .”

“Good luck with your project,” reads still another, signed simply ‘An ex-soldier’. “Try to keep it simple.”

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nd try they did. Perhaps inevitably, though, the Fund’s leaders found their project characterized more by complexity than by simplicity. In particular, they encountered the complexity of feeling that still surrounds Vietnam.

“I remember one of our board meetings,” recalls Wheeler, “where I told the other directors, ‘Whatever design we come up with is going to be one thousand degrees hot.’ I guess that’s a cute phrase, but in fact I don’t think I was ready for how true it was.”

At the urging of Mosley, who had been asked to prepare a recommendation concerning the design of the memorial, the board resolved to hold a design competition rather than simply hire a designer. Not only would a competition serve to
Art Mosley: "We were faced with the real prospect of losing this whole thing unless we arrived at a compromise." Below: Mosley as a West Point cadet in 1963.

emphasize the broadly participatory character of the memorial, Mosley had argued, but it would also likely yield a superior design. The board agreed, stipulating only that the memorial be required to bear the names of all those who died in Vietnam.

Mosley, in turn, further argued that the competition would need a jury of unimpeachable credentials, not only to ensure the quality of the winning design but also to enable the Fund to pass the criticisms which, he predicted, were certain to be leveled against the winning design, no matter what its virtues. Here, too, the board was inclined to agree. Several among the board, however, including Wheeler, were strongly of the opinion that the jury should include at least one Vietnam veteran. Mosley disagreed.

"It was my feeling that unless we could find a Vietnam veteran who was also a design professional of the same caliber as the other jury members, we would be making a mistake," he explains. "First, I felt the jury had to be beyond professional challenge. Second, I felt that if there were a Vietnam vet on the jury, the other jury members might defer to him unduly out of consideration for his position. I didn't think we wanted that to happen."

Wheeler remembers that he was still reluctant to go along.

"I was insisting that there be a Vietnam veteran on the jury," he recalls. "It was very important to me. In the end, though, Art persuaded us that if we wanted to attract world-class competitors we needed a world-class jury."

Predictably, one of the arguments later brought against the design selection process was that the jury had included no Vietnam veterans.

"If you dislike the design," observes Wheeler, "you'll use whatever arguments you can to discredit it, and so, of course, that particular argument was leveled against us. But thanks to Art, we had done our homework. At his suggestion, we had interviewed the prospective jurors before naming them to the jury and satisfied ourselves that we were in a fairly strong position."

Having decided to sponsor a design competition, the Fund next moved to obtain a site for the memorial. Ideally, they felt, the memorial should be on the Mall rather than at some less frequented location. Most observers were doubtful that the Fund would be able to obtain a site on the capital's central promenade, but Wheeler and the others were undeterred. And indeed, several months later, following sustained legwork on Capitol Hill, they were rewarded with a two-acre site near the western end of the Mall in the area known as Constitution Gardens.

At that point, the design competition was turned over to architect Paul Spreiregen, who had experience in the management of design competitions. Believing his own involvement to be at an end, Mosley proceeded with a long-delayed move to Key West, where he planned to continue his work in commercial real estate. Later developments, however, were to bring him back to Washington under far more demanding conditions.
By October 1980, the Fund was ready to proceed with the design competition, which was opened to all American citizens eighteen years of age or older. While it had been recognized at the outset that any winning design would inevitably draw a certain amount of criticism — strong feelings were, after all, in the nature of the Vietnam experience — it was also true that, with the possible exception of Art Mosley, no one connected with the project anticipated the extent of the political firestorm that followed.

In considering the events that came later, it is useful to understand the conditions which governed the competition. In addition to the guidelines concerning size, access, cost, maintenance, and similar factors, the design program sent to each entrant contained the following two injunctions:

"We wish to repeat that the memorial is not to be a political statement, and that its purpose is to honor the service and memory of the war's dead, its missing, and its veterans — not the war itself. The memorial should be conciliatory, transcending the tragedy of the war."

"Design illustrations should be simple, direct, and expressive. Elaborately rendered illustrations are not desired. We seek substantive ideas."

Within several months of the competition announcement, the American design community responded with a flood of entries, surprising even the most hopeful among the Fund’s leaders. Ultimately, more than 1,400 submissions were received, making the competition the largest of its kind ever held. Caught off guard by the unexpected volume of the response, the Fund initially had no space large enough to display the drawings. The Air Force soon came forward with an offer of a hangar at the Andrews Air Force Base, however, and it was there that the entries were displayed for the jury. It was there, too, that a decision was made which — depending on one’s point of view — was either an abomination or a triumph of vision.

After weighing the entries for the better part of a week, the jurors unanimously chose number 1026 (the designs had been submitted “blind” to disguise the names of the individual entrants) as the winner. When names were reassigned to the drawings, entry 1026 turned out to be the work of a 21-year-old Yale undergraduate named Maya Ying Lin. In their citation, the jury had this to say of Lin’s design:

"Of all the proposals submitted, this most clearly meets the spirit and formal requirements of the program. . . . This memorial with its wall of names becomes a place of quiet reflection and a tribute to those who served their nation in difficult times. All who come here can find it a place of healing.

"This is very much a memorial of our own times, one that could not have been achieved in another time and place. The designer has created an eloquent place where the simple meeting of earth, sky and remembered names contains messages for all who will know this place."

What you hope for in a competition like that,” said Art Mosley recently, echoing the design program, “is that it will generate that one great idea. And I think Maya’s design is just that. What she gave us is something very contemplative and understated. In a way, it’s a very Minimalist work of art. What you get from it, I think, depends to a large extent on what you bring to it.

"I remember when we first saw it — we were ecstatic. We realized the jury had found something great. The wall, the arrangement of the names, and the black granite were exactly right. And I think it says a lot for the jury that they recognized it, because in fact there was nothing very special about Maya’s drawings. They were very simple, especially when you compared them to the drawings submitted by the professionals and the design teams, which were done with a lot of polish. What Maya had, though, was a great idea.”
A unique feature of Lin’s design, to which Mosley refers, was the stipulation that the names be arranged not in alphabetical order but in the order in which the casualties occurred—a concept that would vividly demonstrate the war’s somber progress. The names, said Lin, should begin at the wall’s apex, high on the right-hand (or eastern) side, with the date 1959 marking the first casualty. From there the names would fill the eastern wing in order to the farthest panel, where the wall disappears into the earth. Resuming at the farthest extremity of the western wing, the names would build in number as they approached the point of origin at the wall’s apex. There, in the lower right-hand corner of the final panel, would appear the final name together with the date 1975. The war would be brought full circle and, by implication, to a close.

Having accepted the recommendation of the jury, the board moved next to obtain the necessary design approvals. The terms of the congressional resolution required the Fund to secure the formal blessing of the Secretary of the Interior, the city’s Commission of Fine Arts, and the National Capital Planning Commission before going ahead. The storm of controversy that would later break over the memorial was only a distant rumbling at that point, and the necessary approvals were obtained with a minimum of difficulty.

Shortly thereafter, however, resistance to Lin’s design became more vocal and substantially more organized. Among the design’s opponents were Vietnam veteran and Pentagon consultant Tom Carhart, who had been a classmate of Mosley’s at West Point, and Texas businessman H. Ross Perot. Perot, a World War II veteran and a friend of President Ronald Reagan, had in fact been a prominent early contributor to the Fund, but had turned against the effort after seeing Lin’s design.

Ironically, Mosley and Carhart had been good friends at West Point (Mosley still recalls the time, for example, when he and Carhart stole the Navy goat on the eve of an Army-Navy football game) and there remained between them a bond of mutual respect. This helps explain, says Mosley, why Carhart went out of his way to call him one night and tell him there would be trouble.

“He called me and said: ‘I just can’t live with this. There are a lot of us who’ve been looking for a memorial to celebrate and glorify the service of the Vietnam veteran, and this just isn’t it. I want you to know that I’m going to do everything I can to fight this.’

Memorial designer Maya Ying Lin, whose winning drawings are shown at left. Lin is now a student at Harvard’s Graduate School of Design.

“I told him he had a perfect right to do that,” says Mosley, “and that I could understand his feelings. Unfortunately, though, what he was looking for in the memorial wasn’t what we’d asked the designers to give us.”

Explanations availed little, however, and the controversy grew. Exactly how many individuals were opposed to the design is difficult to determine, although sources connected with the Fund suspect that the actual number has always been relatively small. All agree, however, that the opponents were politically well connected, which in Washington can often count for more than mere numerical strength. Aware by now of the mounting trouble, the Fund’s directors asked Mosley to return to Washington to serve as a mediator between the two sides.

By fortunate coincidence, the Fund also had an ally in the White House at this time, a recently appointed White House Fellow named Tom Shull. Like Wheeler, Mosley, and Radez, Shull had attended both West Point and HBS. (A graduate of the West Point class of 1973, he had not been sent to Vietnam.) After receiving his MBA from Harvard in 1981, he had gone on to the White House as a White House Fellow. The only Fellow assigned to the White House itself (according to custom, other Fellows are assigned to the various Cabinet members), Shull joined the staff of James Baker, White House Chief of Staff, and in that capacity reported to presidential assistant Richard
Darman (MBA '67). During his year in the White House he had responsibility for, among other things, the management information systems serving the Executive Office.

Following his year in Washington, he returned to West Point, where he now teaches leadership and organizational behavior. As relatively brief as his stint in the White House was, it proved to be a key factor, according to Wheeler, in the Fund's ability to finally move ahead with the memorial after reaching a near impasse.

"I can tell you this," said Wheeler recently. "There would have been no memorial without Tom Shull, period."

Shull, though, declines to take much credit. According to the young Army captain, he served merely as an intermediary between the different groups involved in the dispute, while at the same time trying to keep the White House informed of the efforts being made toward a compromise.

"I had been asked to track the progress of the memorial," he explains. "As everyone knows, there were a number of interested parties who were not totally satisfied with the design. My role was basically that of a mediator. I had been told by Jim Baker to do what I could to help reconcile the differences between the Fund and the people opposed to the design.

"As for the White House itself, I think it was mostly a matter of convincing the people there that there were no downside risks associated with the memorial — which, in fact, I believed. I think we managed to convince them that there were competent, dedicated public servants managing the project and that it would be well done."

Shull's assistance came at a time when the Fund badly needed a voice in the White House, for the opposition had begun to exert pressure both there and on Capitol Hill, hoping to force a change in the design.

At the same time, the critics had also taken their objections to the press, where the proposed memorial was being denounced by opposition leaders as, variously, "a black ditch," "Lin's inane creation," "a trench," and "the black gash." In a letter to President Reagan, 27 Republican congressman termed the memorial "a political statement of shame and dishonor." Reagan — who during his campaign had called the Vietnam War "a noble cause" — declined to comment on the design. Meanwhile, the dispute grew still more bitter.

While those closest to the Memorial Fund have always insisted on the sincerity and good intentions of their opponents, other observers have suggested that the real dispute has stemmed not from the design at all but from the war itself. If the passions aroused by the design seem familiar, they argue, there's a good reason: they are the same ones aroused by the war. Those who oppose the design, they point out, are more often than not the people who believed most strongly in the correctness of America's involvement in Vietnam — and who likewise remain most bitter over the country's defeat.

"It's been a microcosm of the war," says one observer who has followed the conflict from the start. "The same people are saying the same things."

Another individual, also close to the process and familiar with the objections raised against the design, adds this observation: "Philosophically, I'm not sure that those who served in the war reluctantly shouldn't also be represented [by the memorial]. There were obviously many who served in Vietnam out of a sense of their duty as citizens, but who weren't necessarily committed to the war. Their views, I think, should also be taken into consideration."
Still others have pointed out that the Fund, having obtained the necessary design approvals, was never strictly obliged to sit down and negotiate with the opposition, but did so anyway, conscious that not to do so would have been in some sense to defeat the purpose of the memorial — which was, after all, to help bring about a reconciliation.

Considerations of good faith aside, however, there were also compelling political reasons to negotiate. With each day, it seemed, new pressures were brought to bear to stop the memorial.

As the conflict grew, it became clear that a forum was needed where the two sides could come together to express their feelings. Again Senator Warner stepped forward, this time with an offer to hold a series of open meetings. Grateful for a chance to respond to the criticisms raised by the opposition, and anxious to have their own case heard, the Fund was quick to accept.

In the meantime, however, those opposed to the design had begun to insist that both a statue and a flag be added to the memorial site — a suggestion the Fund’s leaders were reluctant to accept, arguing that the additions would violate the integrity of the original design. However, the strength displayed by the opposition at the first Warner meeting made it clear that the concept of a statue would not go away, no matter how impressive the credentials of the design jury.

In rapid order, the opponents were also able to persuade the Reagan administration to see in the statue-and-flag concept a way out of a growing political dilemma. Although he had given his approval to the original design, Secretary of the Interior James Watt now announced that he would withhold a necessary groundbreaking permit unless the Fund agreed to add a statue and a flag to the memorial site.

“At that point,” observes Mosley, “they basically had the project stopped cold.”

Realizing that the Fund lacked the political strength to contest Watt’s ultimatum, Wheeler and the others acceded to the statue-and-flag concept, reserving only the right to choose the sculptor. The actual siting of the statue would be the responsibility of the Fine Arts Commission, chaired by National Gallery director J. Carter Brown (MBA ‘58).

Working quickly, Shull and others rewrote the original applications for the design approvals to incorporate the new elements. The applications were then resubmitted to Interior, the Fine Arts Commission, and the Capital Planning Commission, who in turn gave their approval once more. As a result, says Shull, the Fund went into the second Warner meeting in a much stronger position, able to demonstrate that the project now had the administration’s blessing.

More important still, in the eyes of some, was the fact that the focal point of the dialogue had been subtly shifted. “The issue had now become where to place the flag and the statue,” notes Shull, who attended both Warner meetings as an observer, “as opposed to whether or not the original design would be built. In effect, the approval of the compromise design legitimized the original design.”

One of the first lessons he learned from Darman, he adds, was that in politics it is important to be able to control the process of decision making, because one thereby controls, in some measure, the decision itself. In retrospect, the second Warner meeting illustrates a successful effort to control the decision-making process — not to orchestrate a meeting, but rather to determine in advance the general form of its outcome.

At that second meeting, the Fund agreed to establish a sculpture panel made up of two representatives from each side of the dispute. The panel, in
turn, would make recommendations to the Fine Arts Commission concerning the placement of the statue and the flag. One member of that panel is Art Mosley.

"The one thing I’ve always kept in mind as we went through this [siting of the sculpture] was that no matter what we came up with, it would have to be approved by Carter Brown," he says. "I knew he wouldn’t approve anything that was inappropriate. He’s a professional — he’s trained to do this — and I know he’ll see that it’s done with taste."

As it happened, the panel’s first recommendation, made largely at the insistence of the statue proponents, was to place the sculpture prominently in the bowl of the memorial — a recommendation the Commission rejected.

The statue (for which only a model now exists) will be the work of sculptor Frederick Hart, the highest-placing sculptor in the original design competition. Inevitably, the statue has drawn its own share of criticism, but the debate this time seems more academic than impassioned, perhaps in part because the presence of a statue on the site is now a foregone conclusion. Hart’s work, as shown by the model, will depict three soldiers, one of them black, caught in a moment of sudden attention to something seen or heard in the middle distance.

Wheeler praises Hart for choosing to make the figures life-size (and not larger than life), for including a black man in the composition, and for grouping the three figures so they are touching one another, signifying what he calls the special bond that exists among all Vietnam veterans.

Other proponents of the original design, while careful to express an appreciation of the difficulties Hart faces in trying to please everyone, have been more reserved in their praise of the model itself.

In an interview broadcast on National Public Radio last winter, Carter Brown was asked whether the decision of the Fine Arts Commission to grant the revised design approval had been, in effect, a choice between politics and aesthetics.

"It might have been," he replied, "if the only choice had been between mucking up the existing design — cluttering it up with something that was going to interrupt the artistic idea — and [adhering to the original concept]. If you’re in a concert and someone is singing ‘The Star Spangled Banner’, you can’t insert a bit of country and western music simply because certain people in the audience happen to prefer that kind of music. However, you can have two pieces at a concert, and you can play one all the way through and then play the other. The way things appear to be working out in this case, I think the essentials of what everyone wants will be there."

Had he always been confident that a resolution was possible?

"I was worried before," admitted Brown, "because obviously you can’t sacrifice artistic integrity. And there’s been such misunderstanding on this point. People think that aesthetics is somehow a separable item, and it’s not — it’s integral. The design is the experience."

In the course of their deliberations, he was asked, had he and the rest of the commission found themselves having to come to terms once more with the war?

"Very much so," he answered. "I think this is one of the very moving things about the memorial, and now that it’s built I think that anyone who walks out into that glade and sees the gentle roll of the earth going down to the black marble wall, which reflects the sky and which allows one’s consciousness to open and expand — anyone who experiences that is going to go away a changed person."

A month after the dedication of the memorial brought more than 150,000 people to Constitution Gardens, nearly a thousand visitors a day were still appearing at the site. Some were coming merely to see the wall they’d heard so much about, others to find the name of a friend or loved one, still others to leave some small souvenir or simply to meditate on a war still vivid in the minds of many.

On an afternoon in late November of last year,
"Going to Harvard was a disorienting experience. When I got there, I found there was a taboo: we didn't talk about the war, or the fact that I was going in. Then my friend Tommy Hayes was killed in action in April, 1968. When I went down to his funeral at West Point, I didn't tell anyone where I was going. When I got back, nobody asked."

"I never forgot Tommy. When you think about a close friend that way, you're also indirectly thinking about yourself. It wasn't so obvious to me then, but it's obvious now. I was honestly remembering Tommy, but, without understanding it, I was also remembering myself and how I felt."

"When you told someone in 1976, or 1979, or 1981 that you served in Vietnam and that you were working to remember your friends, especially those who didn't come back alive, that tended to put a barrier between you and that person."

"I keep asking myself, 'Why am I doing these things or Vietnam?' I obviously want to be a securities lawyer, but at the same time I keep working in this other area. I keep feeling this tug."

"I believe it has to do with something I learned at West Point, and that is that the most important part of war is building the peace. The better you build the peace, the less imminent is the next war. This was never an explicit lesson at West Point, but it was built into the warp and woof of the place. You don't see it until you stand back a little and look."
Wheeler, Radez, and Mosley at the memorial: on time, under budget.

meaning company clerk — and for that reason each such possibility was checked wherever there was a reasonable cause for worry. With a list of nearly 58,000 names, the challenge to get each one correct was enormous.

Nor was that all. Once the master list had been compiled, there remained the further problem of having the names engraved on the granite panels. Given the sheer volume of the work to be done, hand engraving was out of the question. Research by the Fund, however, had uncovered a small firm in Tennessee working to develop an automated engraving process called photo stencil sandblasting. With the Fund’s encouragement the process was perfected, and the Tennessee firm was awarded the engraving contract.

In appearance, Jack Wheeler is the very model of a Washington lawyer, his suit on this November day conservative but not somber, with now and then a flash of suspenders beneath the jacket. At age 38 he is balding and, as befits his West Point training, conspicuously fit. Before making the decision to attend law school, he lived for a year at the Virginia Theological Seminary, where he studied the New Testament in his free time (he was then working for Amtrak) and debated whether or not to enter the ministry. In the end, he chose the law instead. (Ironically, it is his wife, Elisa, who has now become an Episcopal priest.) Nonetheless, there remains something slightly evangelical about Jack Wheeler, as though the missionary impulse will never quite let him rest.

By now, of course, he is among those most familiar with the memorial. For the first-time visitor, however, the approach to the site can be unsettling. If approached from Constitution Avenue, the memorial is literally invisible until one is standing at its very edge. Finding oneself so suddenly at the brink produces a startling effect.

More powerful still, of course, is the impact of the thousands and thousands of names etched in the black granite. One of the two National Park Service volunteers at the memorial keeps a box of tissues at her side, handing them out as needed. On most days they go quickly.

Other evidence of the response evoked by the memorial is not hard to seek. Where the granite panels meet and form a seam, for example, visitors have inserted small flowers opposite the names they have come to find, enlivening the wall up and down its length with small bursts of color. Others have placed bouquets beneath the panels, or small notes, flags, photographs, or other mementos — a box of medals in one case, a pair of jungle boots in another.

The dedication of the memorial (shown on the overleaf) attracted a crowd of 150,000 to Constitution Gardens on a chilly day in November. As he stood on the speakers’ platform, says Wheeler, and saw the people reflected in the polished marble, he recalled the words of St. Paul: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then, face to face.”
addition to an engineering curriculum.) After his graduation, Reich had been commissioned as an officer in the U.S. Public Health Service in Baltimore. "I was the head of their computer center for the better part of two years," he recalls. "It was a brand-new center, and I was involved in writing the bid specifications for would-be computer vendors. I also helped write the systems and applications programs needed to operate the center."

During this same period, Reich began reading in the history and philosophy of science. He remembers being particularly struck by Thomas Kuhn’s *Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* "But my formal introduction to the history of science was a result of happenstance," he says today. "The Baltimore Public Health Service Hospital happens to be right across the street from Johns Hopkins, and I used to use their bookstore and eat in their cafeteria. One day I discovered that Hopkins had something called a ‘History of Science’ department. I went and talked with one of the faculty members, and a year later, in 1972, I enrolled as a graduate student."

While in the Hopkins Ph.D. program, Reich became increasingly interested in the history of technology, and eventually decided to write his dissertation on the development of industrial research in the Bell system and the early years of Bell Laboratories. "I was asking," Reich says, "how and why the company established the laboratory, how the laboratory was run, what impact the company environment had on the scientists and engineers who worked there, and how the laboratory — and its results — influenced the business policies of the company."

In July of 1976, Reich began a three-year appointment as assistant professor of history at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, where he taught courses on the history of American science, technology, and business, on engineering ethics and values, and on energy policy. He also served as institute archivist for a year, organizing several of RPI’s major collections, including the Roebling-Brooklyn Bridge papers. It was from this position that he was called to Rutgers and the Edison Papers in 1979. "Reese Jenkins and I have half-time faculty appointments at Rutgers, and half-time jobs with the Edison papers,” Reich says. "In practice, of course, that means that we teach half time, and work on the project full time.”

This schedule left little time for Reich’s own writing, and it was the urge to write that led to his application for the Newcomen Fellowship. "I’ve wanted to work on this book for quite a while," he says. "I really needed a year to get away from the Edison Papers and to work on it full time.”

The book is a comparison of the establishment of the laboratories at General Electric and Bell. In some respects, says Reich, it is an extension of his dissertation, but the dissertation will constitute only 25 to 30 percent of the new work. "I am an historian," he says, “and the book is therefore historical at heart. I plan to begin in the nineteenth century and try to understand the social and technological landscape in the United States, explaining the factors that led these companies to make the investment in major research laboratories around the turn of the century. Then I’ll look in detail at the companies themselves, their early histories, their previous R&D efforts, and the relationships between the companies’ strategies and the creation of the laboratories. "I’ll then consider the establishment of the labs and compare their operations in depth. You can look at these two laboratories and see very major differences, and my thesis is that they reflect basic differences in the companies that created them. Finally, I’ll try to understand how the companies used the results that came out of their laboratories, and study the impact that the laboratories — and the many others