Also by Alston Chase

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HARVARD
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The Education of an American Terrorist

BY ALSTON CHASE

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We know only that counsel for Mr. Kaczynski have refused to allow us to determine whether Mr. Kaczynski will speak with us. . . . If Mr. Kaczynski suffered from a serious mental illness that would cause him to become uncommunicative in a face-to-face meeting with me, his lawyers would have let me meet with him. As long as counsel for Mr. Kaczynski block efforts to determine whether Mr. Kaczynski refuses to be examined, the most reasonable inference to be drawn from the record is that they are making a tactical decision on his behalf.

“It is my opinion,” Resnick said, “that Mr. Kaczynski is not fearful of a psychiatric examination by government experts due to any mental illness.” Rather, it may be that he “does not want to be unjustly labeled as mentally ill. He may have rationally concluded that if he were labeled mentally ill, his political anti-technology agenda would be denigrated.”

Dietz concurred. Kaczynski, he wrote, “would probably welcome the opportunity to speak freely about his ideas, life, and crimes to someone who understood his true motives. His writings and his stance toward defense doctors lend support to the view that he dreaded defense doctors who seek to prove him mentally ill, but there is no reason to believe he would dread the opportunity to provide further evidence that he is not mentally ill.”

Kaczynski claims not to have been made aware of the prosecution’s request to have its mental-health experts examine him until nearly a month after his attorneys had refused to grant it.

In fact, he wasn’t afraid of psychological examinations. On at least one occasion he had sought psychiatric help on his own. What he feared was an insanity diagnosis that would undermine public credibility of his ideas. And in all probability, prosecution psychiatrists would have provided precisely the imprimatur of mental health that he so anxiously sought.

Complicating the assessment of Kaczynski’s mental condition were repercussions from an earlier episode in the defendant’s life about which the media knew nothing and that Bisceglie described to me as his “bad experience at Harvard.”

Indeed, even the defense team and the family knew next to nothing about his Harvard experience. They only knew that Kaczynski had participated in a three-year experiment at the university, conducted by Professor Henry Murray, during which he had been given a battery of psychological tests.

Anxious to disprove his family’s claims that he had been mentally ill since childhood, Kaczynski asked his attorneys to obtain the results of these tests, which, he was convinced, would reveal that he had been normal at the time. “The assessment arrived at by the [Harvard] psychologists,” Kaczynski explained later, “would be very useful in determining how people saw my personality.”

But although the Murray Center at Harvard where these documents were kept gave Kaczynski’s attorneys some raw data—his answers to test questions—it reportedly refused to provide the Murray team’s analysis of that data.

Whatever the reason or extent of Harvard’s reluctance to produce these analyses, Kaczynski’s defense attorneys apparently didn’t press very hard for them. They never subpoenaed the material. And they had a motive for not doing so: These Harvard evaluations might have undermined their case.

Rather than insist that Harvard turn over the Murray Center’s own analyses of the tests, the defense team asked the Gurs and Froming to provide their own evaluation of answers Kaczynski had given on two of them—the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). Predictably, they concluded that this data indicated Kaczynski had suffered from paranoid-type schizophrenia while at Harvard. After examining the same data, the prosecution’s own expert, John Kenny, concluded the answers did not reveal mental illness at all.

As prosecution and defense experts argued over retrospective analyses of the Harvard data about whose purpose and circumstances they knew virtually nothing, the media, comprehending even less, jumped to the conclusion that if Kaczynski had received psychological evaluation as an undergraduate, he must have already shown signs of mental illness at the time. As ABC’s Forrest Sawyer remarked during a 20/20 interview
Henry A. Murray as lieutenant colonel in the Office of Strategic Services. Shortly after this photo was taken in early 1946, Murray returned to Harvard, soon to begin research on "the Dyad." (Psychology Archives, University of Akron)
Researchers who almost certainly knew better sometimes employed unconsenting healthy subjects in research that offered them no medical benefits.

—Final Report of the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments

"I had been talked or pressured into participating in the Murray study against my better judgment."

—Ted Kaczynski
to attorney Michael Mello,
August 24, 1998

In the fall of 1959, Harvard sophomores who had enrolled in a popular psychology course received a curious invitation. "Would you," it asked, "be willing to contribute to the solution of certain psychological problems (parts of an ongoing program of research in the development of personality) by serving as a subject in a series of experiments or taking a number of tests (average about 2 hours a week) through the academic year (at the current College rate per hour)?"

The consent form failed to say that experiments would last not one, but three academic years. It did not reveal that students would be deceived. Nor did it provide information about the experiment's purpose or possible effects. Conducted by a team of psychologists headed by Henry A. Murray of the Department of Social Relations, this was the most elaborate in a series of three-year studies that Murray had undertaken during the 1940s and 1950s, entitled "Multiform Assessments of Personality Development Among Gifted College Men."

Around seventy students volunteered. Each was given a battery of psychological tests to determine his suitability as a study subject. Researchers were looking for a few "average" individuals as well as those representing extremes—some highly alienated and others exceptionally well adjusted. As Murray put it, they sought to enlist students who were "at the extreme of avowed alienation, lack of identity, pessimism, etc.," as well as those "at the opposite extreme (reporting nearly optimal physical, mental, and social well-being)."

Based on this prescreening, researchers picked twenty-two undergraduates, four or five of whom were deemed as belonging to each of the two polar opposite categories. Among those chosen was Ted Kaczynski. Of the nineteen people (not including Kaczynski) whose biographical data I reviewed at Harvard's Murray Research Center, eight were prep school graduates, two having attended Murray's alma mater, the exclusive Episcopal boarding school, Groton. At least ten were members of very wealthy families, some exceedingly prominent. The rest came from a solidly professional class background whose parents included a high school principal, an architect, a factory owner, the manager of an industrial plant, and an Ivy League professor. Kaczynski was the only blue-collar boy in the bunch.

To preserve their privacy, the experimental data referred to each student by a code name, carefully chosen by Murray himself. The pseudonym began with the letter that followed alphabetically immediately after the first letter of the student's last name, and was intended to capture the essence of the student's personality. "Murray was very good at
something akin to someone being strapped on the electric chair with these electrodes. . . . I really started getting hit real hard. . . . Wham, wham, wham! And me getting hotter and more irritated and my heart beat going up. . . . and sweating terribly. . . . there I was under the lights and with movie camera and all this experimenta- tion equipment on me. . . . It was sort of an unpleasant experience.

"Right away," said another, code-named "Trump," describing his experience afterward, "I didn't like [the interrogator]."

[Dr. G] . . . came waltzing over and he put on those electrodes but in that process, while he was doing that, kind of whistling, I was looking over the room, and right away I didn't like the room. I didn't like the way the glass was in front of me through which I couldn't see, but I was being watched and right away that puts one in a kind of unnatural situation and I noted the big white lights and again that heightens the unnatural effect. There was something peculiar about the set-up too, it was supposed to look homely or look natural, two chairs and a little table, but again that struck me as unnatural before the big piece of glass and the lights. And then [Mr. H] . . . who was bubbling over, dancing around, started to talk to me about he liked my suit . . . the buzzer would ring or something like that, we were supposed to begin . . . he was being sarcastic or pretty much of a wise guy. . . . And the first thing that entered my mind was to get up and ask him outside immediately . . . but that was out of the question, because of the electrodes and the movie and all that . . . I kind of sat there and began to fume and then he went on and he got my goat and I couldn't think of what to say . . . And then they came along and they took my electrodes off.

One subject, "Hinge," thought he was "being attacked." Another, "Naisfield," complained: "The lights were very bright. . . . Then the things were put on my legs and whatsoever and on the arm. . . . I didn't like the feel of the sticky stuff that was on there being sort of uncomfortable."

Although the "stressful dyadic proceeding" served as the centerpiece of Murray's experiment (taking place during the winter of 1960), it was merely one among scores of different tests the students took in order to allow Murray and his associates to acquire, as Murray wrote, "the most accurate, significant, and complete knowledge and understanding of a single psychological event that is obtainable."

Before the dyadic confrontation took place, Murray and his colleagues interviewed the students in depth about their hopes and aspirations. During this same period the subjects were required to write not only essays explaining their philosophies of life but also autobiographies, in which they were told to answer specific, intimate questions on a range of subjects from thumb-sucking and toilet training to masturbation and erotic fantasies. And they faced a battery of tests that included, among others, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a Rorschach test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the California Psychological Inventory, a "fantasy inventory," a psychological-types inventory, the Maudalay Personality Inventory, an "inventory of self-description," a "temperament questionnaire," a "time-metaphor test," a "basic disposition test," a "range of experience inventory," a "philosophical outlook test," a food-preference inventory, analyses of their literary tastes and moral precepts, an "odor association test," a "word association test," an argument-completion test, a Wyatt finger-painting test, a projective-drawings test, and a "Rosenzweig picture frustration test." The results were then analyzed by researchers, who plotted them in numerous ways in an effort to develop a psychological portrait of each personality in all its dimensions.

Only after most of this data had been collected did researchers administer the stressful dyadic confrontation. Following this session, each student was called back for several "recall" interviews and sometimes asked to comment on the movie of himself being reduced to impotent anger by the interrogator. During these replays, Murray wrote, "you will see yourself making numerous grimaces and gestures" and "uttering incongruent, disjunctive, and unfinished sentences."

In the last year of the experiment, Murray made the students available to his graduate student assistants, to serve as guinea pigs for their own research projects. By graduation, as Keniston summarized the process, "each student had spent approximately two hundred hours in the research, and had provided hundreds of pages of information about
himself, his beliefs, his past life, his family, his college life and development, his fantasies, his hopes and dreams.

Why were the students willing to endure this ongoing stress and probing into their private lives? Some who had assisted Murray confessed to me that they wondered about this themselves. But they—and we—can only speculate that a few of the students (including Kaczynski) did it for the money; that some (again probably including Kaczynski) had doubts about their own psychic health and were seeking reassurance about it; that some, suffering from Harvard’s culture of despair, were lonely and needed someone to talk to; and that some simply had an interest in helping to advance scientific knowledge. But we do not know for sure. Alden E. Wessman, a former research associate of Murray’s who has long been bothered by the ethical dimension of this study, said to me recently, “Later, I thought: We took and took and used them and what did we give them in return?”

Indeed, even by the standards of that day, these “stressful disputes” were unethical. For they violated what was and still is regarded as the holy writ of experimental ethics, known as the Nuremberg Code, which forbids deceiving participants.

The Code was inspired by the experience of jurists conducting the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials of Nazi concentration camp doctors following World War II. After the trial, the judges, concerned that there had been no clear guidelines available to them on which to base their condemnation of these defendants, promulgated ten rules of their own to be used in future such trials. The first and most important of these was what would become known as the requirement for “informed consent.”

“Voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” the judges declared. And “the person involved should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress . . . .”

These requirements, together with subsequent stipulations prohibiting unduly risky testing, formed the heart of the Nuremberg Code and would be quickly hailed as the golden rules for experimentation on human subjects. Even before the conclusion of the War Crimes Trials, in 1946, the American Medical Association adopted a distillation of the Code as mandatory for research on humans. And “by the late 1950s,” stated The Final Report of the President’s Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (published later), “many and perhaps even most American medical researchers had come to recognize the Nuremberg Code as the most authoritative single answer to an important Question: What are the rules for human experimentation?”

Nevertheless, as the Advisory Committee observed, “many researchers were not entirely happy with the prospect of living by the letter of the Code.” In fact, the majority, while paying lip-service to the Code sought either to water it down or ignore it. Most prominent among the institutions contesting it was the Harvard Medical School, whose administrative board member, Henry K. Beecher, would in 1962 object to a U.S. Army proposal to require its research to conform to the Code by observing that it overlooked the fact that “valid, informed consent may be difficult to obtain in some cases.” Eventually, the Advisory Committee reported, Harvard was able to persuade the army surgeon general to concede that “the ‘principles’ being inserted into Harvard’s research contracts with the Army were ‘guidelines’ rather than ‘rigid rules.’”

Before the ink was dry at Nuremberg, therefore, many researchers were already ignoring the Code. In a particularly infamous experiment conducted in 1962 by a Yale professor, Stanley Milgram, subjects (forty men recruited through mail solicitation and a newspaper ad) were led to believe that they were delivering ever more powerful electric shocks to a stranger, on orders from the researcher. Nearly two thirds of them continued to obey the orders even when they were asked to administer the highest level of shock, labeled: Danger: Severe Shock.

Some participants broke down on learning of their potential for cruelty. “I observed a mature and initially poised businessman enter the laboratory smiling and confident,” Milgram wrote of one of his study subjects. “Within 20 minutes he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck, who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse.”

Like Milgram, Murray had violated the Nuremberg Code. Why, then, did he undertake the experiment? His motives would remain obscure. No one seems sure what the “certain psychological problems” were that he sought to solve. The subjects were given almost no infor-
mation and what they were told was in large part false. Murray's graduate assistants knew little more. In 1963, after the series was completed, Murray asked the National Institute of Mental Health for support "to finish writing a book" based on the data he had collected. But apparently he never even started it. Keniston, who assisted Murray in these experiments, told me that he wasn't sure what the goals were. "Murray was not the most systematic scientist," he explained.

Murray himself gave curiously equivocal answers. At times his explanations seemed circular—defining the Dyad in terms of the Dyad, for example, or when, without defining the term, he suggested his intent was to gather as much raw data as possible about one "dyadic" event, which could then be used in different ways to help "develop a theory of dyadic systems." At other times he recalled the idealistic goal of acquiring knowledge that would lead to improving human personality development.

Then, again, Murray at times suggested that his research might have no value at all. "Quo bono?" he once asked. "As [the data] stand they are nothing but raw data, meaningless as such; and the question is what meaning, what intellectual news, can be extracted from them?" In another context, he asked: "Are the costs in man-hours incurred by our elaborate, multiple procedures far greater than any possible gains in knowledge?"

Was his motivation not perhaps science at all, but what Germans call Schadenfreude—taking pleasure in others' discomfort? One of Murray's former assistants told Forrest Robinson, Murray's biographer, that the professor's real interest was just to see what happened when one person attacked another. Some of Murray's own comments seem to support this interpretation, such as his "Notes on Dyadic Research," dated March 16, 1959, stating that an ongoing goal of the research (which he admitted was focused heavily on "degree of anxiety and disintegration") was to "design and evaluate instruments and procedures for the prediction of how each subject will react in the course of a stressful dyadic proceeding."

Not only the purpose of his experiment but Murray himself would remain a puzzle. As the late psychologist Leopold Bellak explained to Robinson, Murray, while personally gracious and generous, could also be "elusive, exasperating." Even the normally sympathetic Robinson would describe Murray as "mysterious and ungraspable."

To the end of his long life (he died in 1988 at the age of ninety-five), Murray kept two secrets. One of these secrets few would learn until his death. The second is only now being revealed for the first time. The key to unlocking both lies in fathoming Murray's obsession with what he called "the Dyad."
Murray’s most telling contribution to method is that of using the same subjects for the whole program of the research group. . . [T]he subjects quite naturally become friendly with the investigators, and the investigators with the subjects. . . . But Murray has also been much occupied with creating concrete situations of an emotionally involving character.


We were told that we were to engage in a debate about our personal philosophies, and then found that our adversary in the debate subjected us to various insults that, presumably, the psychologists helped him to concoct. It was a highly unpleasant experience.

—Ted Kaczynski
to attorney Michael Mello, September 19, 1998

At the time Kaczynski reluctantly agreed to participate in the Multiform Assessment experiments, Henry Murray was a towering figure in the world of psychology, approaching the end of a remarkably distinguished career. His Explorations in Personality (1938), defining a whole new field of personality assessment that he called “personology,” is considered a classic by many. Murray, with his friend and colleague Christiana Morgan, conceived the Thematic Apperception Test, or TAT, which became widely used by psychologists as a tool for probing the psyche.

During World War II, while working for the Office of Strategic Services (precursor of the CIA), Murray helped develop a system for testing recruits’ capacity for clandestine warfare that inspired an entirely new technology of employee evaluation, widely used by government and business today.

Murray is also deemed the co-founder of humanistic psychology, a discipline dedicated to expanding human potential, that gave birth to a variety of alternative therapies of the 1960s and 1970s.

Despite Murray’s august reputation, however, those who knew him disagree widely about how to assess his science and character. Some still idolize him. These consider the TAT a lasting achievement and the Explorations, as one former colleague, Edwin Shneidman, described it to me, “the most important book in psychology since William James’s Principles of Psychology appeared in 1890.”

Others, while attesting to Murray’s charm and creative imagination, say he didn’t accomplish much. They dismiss the Explorations as brilliant for its time but of no enduring value. And despite Murray’s repeated claims throughout his professional career that he was working on many more books, he never completed another.

Rather, say these critics, Murray’s major contribution was his influence on students. He was “a great initiator, with marvelous ideas but little follow-through,” as Morgan’s biographer, Claire Douglas, puts it.

Some suggested that he feared to publish because this would expose him to criticism, which he couldn’t tolerate. For he did, indeed, have very thin skin. Invariably, he made a charming initial impression. An extraordinarily good listener, he could appear utterly enthralled by someone he’d just met. Yet at the first sign that this worship was not requited, he turned, often treating the other cruelly.
"The great Murray," wrote another former colleague, Frank Barron, "didn't like anyone to leave him, he liked to be the one to leave." The late psychologist David McClelland told Robinson in 1970 that Murray hurt people by his consistent paranoia, that people didn't love him enough, or something... he is extremely sensitive, super-sensitive, and the kind of games he plays always end up with all the people his own age very irritated and withdrawing from the game. With younger people it can be extremely damaging... [T]here wasn't anybody that he was close to, that I know of, really close to, that didn't end up bleeding when he left... Harry is so super-sensitive that even hinting [criticism] during his lifetime would be disastrous, in terms of your relationship with him.

In short, Murray took everything personally. He couldn't keep his feelings and science apart, and was unable to decide whether he was a humanist exploring his own soul or a scientist studying the psyches of others. He embodied the conflict, ongoing in academe at the time, between humanism and science.

As a humanist, Murray was for many years among Lewis Mumford's best friends, until the two—which was not unusual for Murray—drifted apart. Politically liberal, Murray feared for the future of civilization and advocated implementing the agenda of the United World Federalists, which called for a single world government as the only way the human race could be prevented from extinguishing itself. The atomic bomb, he wrote Mumford, "is the logical & predictable result of the course we have been madly pursuing for a hundred years." The choice for humanity was "One World or No World."

Yet, unlike Mumford, Murray, who not only had a medical degree but a Ph.D. in biochemistry, maintained a deep faith in science, which he saw as the key to reforming humanity. Crucial to achieving this change was learning the secret of successful relationships between people, communities, and nations.

This tension between Murray's humanism and science affected his research profoundly. To ensure objectivity, scientific protocol demands the investigator keep distance between himself and his study subjects, so that personal relations do not affect the outcome. Otherwise, the subject's feelings about the experimenter, or the experimenter's feelings about the subjects, could "contaminate" (i.e., skew) the conclusions.

Murray, however, invited contamination. He wasn't careful about protocol. He liked to feel that the student subjects liked him. His research lacked the objective controls that the scientific method demanded. As one of his former colleagues, Henry Riecken, told me, "Murray was no scientist, no experimenter. One could hardly call the exercises to which he subjected Kaczynski and his cohort 'experiments.'"

This mingling of the personal and professional, the humanistic and scientific, was more than accidental. It was the essence of the Dyad. Seemingly scientific, "the Dyad" was in fact a personal concept, signifying to Murray the strange, and secret, forty-year love affair he had with Christiana Morgan. "It became clear," Robinson writes, "that the secret love affair was the key to it all. It everywhere energized and informed the public career; was the hidden center, the focus, the source of inspiration and direction."

In short, Murray's science was an extension of his private life. The two intersected in the Dyad, and the key to understanding both lay in his past.

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Born in New York City on May 13, 1893, into a wealthy and well-connected family, during his early years Murray seemed destined to live an utterly conventional life. His father was a descendant of John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore, and his mother was the scion of a distinguished New England family. Murray attended Groton, then Harvard, where he was a member of the elite A.D. Club, graduating in 1915. A year later he married Josephine Rantoul, herself from an old New England family. In 1919 he was awarded a degree in medicine from Columbia University and in 1927 a Ph.D. in biochemistry from Cambridge University.

Yet, like so many privileged people whose outwardly conventional lives hide eccentricities, Murray's seeming propriety masked a private life bordering on the bizarre. Feeling rejected by a hypercritical mother and tormented by his domineering older sister, Murray grew into a com-
chopath for a day. "I said to myself, Wow!" Blum told me. "Imagine getting paid for what we do anyway!"

Platt thinks it was the other way round—that Blum first told him about the experiment. Others recall hearing about it from graduate students or the undergraduate employment bureau, or seeing a notice on the Social Relations Department bulletin board.

After initial screening by technicians from the Department of Social Relations, that included testing their capacity to tolerate frustration and taking the TAT and other personality inventories, they reported to the Psychopathic Hospital, a Harvard institution. There, a graduate student in social relations passed around a tray containing little vials of a clear, colorless, and odorless liquid, which they were told to drink. They were told the glasses contained something called "lysergic acid" and might produce an "altered state," but otherwise they had no idea what to expect.

Each had different recollections of what happened next. Some believe the investigators tried to sow discord between them, to see how they would react. Blum says that one volunteer had a bad trip and tore a telephone off the wall. But none can remember doing it. They all seem to remember some became paranoid, but can't recall who. Before dying in an automobile accident in 1966, Robert Worth Ringham, Jr., another participant, told me that he had a bad trip, too. The experience scared him. Platt remembers being "mildly schizophrenic." Bingham and Platt never took LSD again. But the experience changed Blum's life. He stayed with the program and has been marching to his own drummer ever since. Today, he lives in Hawaii, where he sells what he calls "oracular things" such as tarot cards and the Book of Runes for a living.

These students did not know that Dr. Hyde had dosed them with LSD for the CIA. Quite unwittingly, they had become combatants in the Cold War, a conflict in which America's covert intelligence agencies, with the complicity of hundreds of university professors, pursued ethically questionable research—some involving drugs, others not—often using students as guinea pigs.

By employing money as the carrot, defense agencies hijacked the chemical, biological, and social sciences. They lavishly supported research projects they wanted, while allowing those in which they had no interest to languish for lack of funds. And what they wanted were new tools for controlling, transforming, and directing human behavior—whether for purposes of propaganda, interrogation, screening spies, training military recruits, analyzing enemy countries and their leaders, or creating a new "democratic man."

The psychological research establishment would lead the way in this co-optation, forging an alliance with government that would transform the field, empower its practitioners, and set in motion events contributing to the culture of despair in the 1950s, the student counterrevolution of the 1960s, and terrorism in the 1990s.

Murray's personality theory would be central to the whole endeavor. Throughout this disturbing history, the professor's name keeps popping up. Like Zelig, the title character in Woody Allen's movie, at nearly every critical juncture Murray can be seen in the picture, largely unnoticed, somewhere in the back row, staring enigmatically at the camera.

It all started with the best of intentions...

In July 1940, a small group of social scientists began meeting informally in New York City at the home of a neighbor of Murray's to discuss how they could help prepare America for the war they saw coming. Declaring that "in the present crisis Morale will probably be the decisive factor and that the United States must employ her tremendous morale resources to the fullest extent for a long time to come," they called themselves the Committee for National Morale.

It was an elite assemblage. Three well-known cultural anthropologists—Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and Gregory Bateson—attended. So did a veritable Who's Who of leading psychologists, among them Carl Menninger, co-founder of the Menninger Clinic; Hadley Cantril, who just that summer had established Princeton's Office of Public Opinion Research; as well as Harvard's Harry Murray and Gordon Allport.

Soon the group was conducting research, Forrest Robertson explains, "often on request from the federal government, on various aspects of strategy and propaganda." But many attending had a more ambitious mission in mind. As Mead put it in 1942, "We must see this war as a prelude to a greater job—the restructuring of the culture of the
world." Yet, however well intentioned the participants' hubris, these meetings also signaled the beginning of the transformation of psychology into a new intellectual technology whose primary mission, during the coming world war and Cold War, would be to serve the covert military establishment.

The Committee for National Morale was merely one of many cooperative efforts between the social sciences and government during the years leading up to the war. In 1939, the Emergency Committee in Psychology was formed "to prepare the profession for a great national crisis," which the following year would be reorganized under the auspices of the Division of Anthropology and Psychology of the National Research Council. During this same pre-war period, the Social Science Research Council would sponsor various studies on how the war would affect the civilian population.

When these organizations sprang to life, the social sciences were relatively new fields. In academe, psychology had been considered merely a branch of moral philosophy until 1876, when William James began teaching a course on the physiology of psychology at Harvard. Not until World War I did this new discipline gain prominence. When the shooting started in August 1914, both the Allies and the Axis discovered the need for experts to evaluate the suitability of military recruits for warfare and to develop propaganda that would boost national, and undermine enemy, morale. The United States embraced this new science in 1917 when President Woodrow Wilson established the Committee of Public Information, aimed at directing America's propaganda efforts.

Between the wars, private social science think tanks proliferated: Morton Prince's (later Murray's) Psychological Clinic, founded at Harvard in 1926; John Dollard's Institute of Human Relations at Yale in 1929; Hadley Cantril's Public Opinion Research Project at Princeton in 1940; and Harold Lasswell's Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communication at the Library of Congress (with private funds), also in 1940.

These social scientists were convinced that their new discipline could save democracy from both its enemies and itself. Freud had persuaded them that, rather than being rational, people are captives of their instinctual desires, and that human survival depended on strengthening the cultural forces that redirected these impulses in constructive directions.

"The fateful question for the human species," Freud had observed in Civilization and its Discontents, is "whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disturbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction." Freud explained in a letter to Albert Einstein that we must make whatever "psychical modifications" are necessary to bring about "a progressive displacement of instinctual aims and a restriction of instinctual impulses... Whatever fosters the growth of culture works at the same time against war."

Adolf Hitler showed what happened when these aggressive instincts were exploited rather than controlled. The success of his propagandist, Josef Goebbels, in using psychology to manipulate Germans to commit barbaric acts offered additional evidence of humanity's fundamental irrationality. Psychology came to be seen as a powerful tool that could be used for good (when employed by an enlightened elite) or for evil (when used by Hitler).

The rise of psychology in public policy was, then, yet another manifestation of the culture of despair. Psychological techniques of manipulation were thought necessary because people are ruled not by reason, but by dark, inchoate emotions. The masses could not be trusted; or, as the historian Ellen Herman puts it, summarizing the thinking of this time, "mass opinion was dangerous as well as fickle... [It] was a real threat to rational planning."

But if the people could not rule wisely, how would democracy survive? This was what New York Law School Professor Edward A. Purcell, Jr., termed the "crisis of democratic theory" that many intellectuals believed they confronted. And it led to uncomfortable conclusions.

Most scholars were politically liberal. They voted for Roosevelt, publicly praised "the common man," and wanted to save democracy. Yet in their heart of hearts they had lost faith in people and embraced a new paternalism. They became what historian Brett Gary calls "nervous liberals," beset by "propaganda anxieties." Saving democracy, these scholars concluded, required new psychological techniques that would point public opinion in "correct" directions. Social science was seen as not just a way to understand man, but to control him as well. It would pro-
University researchers would soon discover that, like Dr. Faustus, the legendary Renaissance magician who sold his soul to the devil in exchange for knowledge and power, they had signed a contract before reading the fine print. And the fine print contained an ethical trap: Saving the world required the sacrifice—of others. In the name of the highest ideals, some would commit the lowest of crimes. Others, while not quite doing evil, simply lost their ethical direction. For both, this journey from high to low was such a gradual descent that many did not notice.

And among these fellow travelers would be Professor Murray himself.

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The agency’s interest began with its precursor, the OSS, in 1942, when General Donovan, anxious to perfect interrogation techniques for captured spies, established a “truth drug” committee of prominent psychologists, including Dr. Winfred Overholser, superintendent of St. Elizabeth’s hospital in Washington, D.C., and Dr. Edward Strecke, president of the American Psychiatric Association. The committee began testing a wide variety of chemicals on test subjects, from peyote and marijuana to “goofball” concoctions of sedatives and stimulants.

The following year, an obscure Swiss chemist named Albert Hoffmann, working for the Sandoz pharmaceutical company, accidentally imbibed a concoction he had created while looking for a circulation stimulant. The chemical was D-lysergic acid diethylamide, better known today as LSD. Without warning, Hoffmann found himself experiencing what was the world’s first acid trip. Coincidentally, at the same time, across the Rhine River in Germany, Nazi doctors were testing another hallucinogenic drug, mescaline, on inmates at the Dachau concentration camp.

The discovery of the Nazis’ Dachau notes after the war by U.S. Navy investigators triggered intense interest in mescaline in American intelligence circles. But it also generated alarm. The field of psychoactive drugs, it seemed, was yet another defense-related area in which the Nazis had been ahead of the Allies. To snatch up these Nazi experts in the dark sciences before the Soviets got them, the Pentagon launched “Operation Paperclip,” a highly secret program to bring some of these German scientists into America. As most had been Nazis, their entry into the United States was prohibited by law. So Paperclip officials smuggled them in, forging, deleting, and doctoring documents to erase evidence of their Nazi past.

Some Paperclip scientists, such as the famous rocket specialist and Nazi Party member Werner von Braun, went to work in the U.S. space program. Others were chemical warfare specialists, experts on everything from sterilization to mass extermination. Among these were members of the former team of doctors already wanted by the U.S. Army war crimes unit for having conducted the ghoul什 “high-altitude” (oxygen and pressure deprivation) experiments on Dachau inmates that killed at least seventy. These men would carry on similar research for the U.S. Air Force. Still other Paperclip scientists were sent to Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, where they were put on the CIA payroll and began testing Nazi nerve and mustard gases on unwitting American GIs, seriously injuring several.

Soon, the very same Nazis who had helped to develop nerve gas and “Zyklon B”—the gas used to exterminate Jews at Auschwitz—were helping to perfect America’s own “Psychochemical Warfare” program, testing everything from alcohol to LSD on unsuspecting American soldiers. At Edgewood and Fort Holabird, Maryland (where I was stationed as a young second lieutenant in intelligence in 1957–58) at least one thousand soldiers were given up to twenty doses of LSD. Some, locked in boxes and then given LSD, went temporarily insane. Others had epileptic seizures.

In 1949, a Viennese chemist named Otto Kauders gave a lecture on LSD at the Boston Psychopathic Hospital, claiming that this newly discovered drug artificially and temporarily induced psychosis. This claim would later be found false—acid trips are not at all like psychosis—but Kauders’s account impressed the hospital staff. If LSD reproduced the symptoms of psychosis, they reasoned, this proved that the disease had a chemical base. So studying LSD’s effects might lead them to drugs for treating mental illness.

Shortly after Kauders’s talk, one hospital staffer, Max Rinkel, ordered a supply of LSD from Sandoz and then persuaded his colleague Robert Hyde to test it on himself. Hyde’s ensuing trip—the first by an
American—fired his enthusiasm for further experimentation. Research on one hundred subjects began at Harvard's Boston Psychopathic under Hyde's direction in 1950.

Meanwhile, the CIA was in hot pursuit of the elusive truth drug. After the Soviets' 1949 show trial of the Hungarian prelate Cardinal József Mindszenty, this pursuit turned into a race. At the trial, the cardinal confessed to crimes he clearly didn't commit, and acted as though he were sleepwalking. Other Soviet show trials demonstrated the same apparent "brainwashing" of prisoners. Later, it would be learned that the Soviets didn't use drugs at all to accomplish this. Their major weapon was psychology—and sleep deprivation. But at the time, the CIA suspected the Soviets had some super-mind-control drug. And they had to have it too.

In 1949, according to John Marks, who first broke the story of CIA experimentation with LSD, the agency's head of Scientific Intelligence went to Western Europe to learn more about Soviet techniques and to supervise experiments of his own, in order, this official explained, to "apply special methods of interrogation for the purpose of evaluation of Russian practices." By the spring of 1950, the agency established a special program under its security division named "Operation Bluebird" to test behavior-control methods, and started recruiting university scholars to work for the program. Bluebird scientists began experimenting on North Korean prisoners of war and others. They tried "ice-pick lobotomies," electroshock, and other "neural-surgical techniques," as well as a host of drugs including cocaine, heroin, and even something called a "stupid bus," whose effects remain classified to this day.

To pursue these shadowy endeavors, the government enlisted the elite of the American psychological establishment, either as conduits, consultants, or researchers. According to a later agency review, these helpers included at least ninety-three universities and other governmental or nonprofit organizations, including Harvard, Cornell, the University of Minnesota, the Stanford University School of Medicine, the Lexington, Kentucky, Narcotics Farm, several prisons and peniti
taries, the Office of Naval Research, and the National Institutes of Health.

Project Bluebird was renamed "Project Artichoke" in 1951, and in that same year the CIA discovered LSD. When the Korean War drew to a close the following spring, the CIA's interest in the drug became an obsession.

As American prisoners of the Chinese were repatriated, authorities discovered to their horror that 70 percent had either made confessions of "guilt" for participating in the war or had signed petitions calling for an end to the U.S. war effort in Asia. Fifteen percent collaborated fully with the Chinese, and only 5 percent refused to cooperate with them at all. Clearly, the Chinese had found new and formidable brainwashing techniques that could transform American servicemen into "Manchurian candidates" programmed to do Communist bidding. America faced a brainwash gap!

Pushing the panic button, in April 1953 the CIA replaced Project Artichoke with a more ambitious effort called MKULTRA, under the direction of Sidney Gottlieb, a brilliant chemist with a degree from CalTech. Gottlieb was the ultimate dirty trickster, having personally participated in attempts to assassinate foreign leaders. And he immediately put his talents to work, this time against Americans.

Once MKULTRA was established, say Lee and Shlain, "almost overnight a whole new market for grants in LSD research sprang into existence as money started pouring through CIA-linked conduits." Among these conduits was the Josiah J. Macy Foundation, whose director was an ex-OSS officer named Frank Fremon-Smith. And among the beneficiaries of this covert funding would be Harold Abramson, an acquaintance of Gregory Bateson's, who was an allergist at New York's Mount Sinai Hospital and a CIA consultant to Edgewood Arsenal's Paperclip scientists. Another was Hyde's group at Boston Psychopathic.

The aim, Gottlieb explained, was "to investigate whether and how it was possible to modify an individual's behavior by covert means." LSD, he hoped, would turn out to be the Swiss Army knife of mind control—an all-purpose drug that could ruin a man's marriage, change his sexual behavior, make him lie or tell the truth, destroy his memory or help him recover it, induce him to betray his country or program him to obey orders or disobey them.

Soon, MKULTRA was testing all conceivable drugs on every kind of victim, including prison inmates, mental patients, foreigners, the terminally ill, homosexuals, and ethnic minorities. Altogether, it conducted tests at fifteen penal and mental institutions, concealing its role by using
the U.S. Navy, the Public Health Service, and the National Institute of Mental Health as funding conduits. During the ten years of MKULTRA's existence, the agency's inspector general reported after its termination in 1963, the program experimented with "electro-shock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials."

Its brainwashing research also took the CIA to Canada, where the agency hired an eminently prestigious psychologist, Dr. D. Ewen Cameron, president of the Canadian, American, and World Psychiatric associations and head of the Allen Memorial Institute at McGill University (which had been founded with money from the Rockefeller Foundation). Cameron's studies centered on what he called "depatternning" and what one CIA operative described as the "creation of a vegetable." This entailed giving unwitting test subjects bevvies of drugs that caused them to sleep for several weeks, virtually straight, with only brief waking intervals. This was followed by up to sixty-five days of powerful electroshock "therapy," where each jolt was twenty to forty times more intense than standard electroshock treatment. After this program, some were given LSD and put in sensory deprivation boxes for another sixty-five days.

By the late 1950s, the CIA and LSD had become virtually inseparable. The advent of LSD, Timothy Leary would declare later, "was no accident. It was all planned and scripted by the Central Intelligence." Indeed, it was. As Lee and Shlain explain:

Nearly every drug that appeared on the black market during the 1960s—marijuana, cocaine, heroin, PCP, amyl nitrite, mushrooms, DMT, barbiturates, laughing gas, speed and many others—had previously been scrutinized, tested, and in some cases refined by CIA and army scientists. But of all the techniques explored by the Agency in its multimillion-dollar twenty-five-year quest to conquer the human mind, none received as much attention or was embraced with such enthusiasm as LSD-25. For a time CIA personnel were completely infatuated with the hallucinogen. Those who first tested LSD in the early 1950s were convinced that it would revolutionize the cloak-and-dagger trade.

To push its drugs, the CIA sought help from the university elite. In 1969, John Marks reports, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs published a fascinating little study designed to curb illegal LSD use. The authors wrote that the drug's "early use was among small groups of intellectuals at large Eastern and West Coast universities. It spread to undergraduate students, then to other campuses. Most often, users have been introduced to the drug by persons of high status. Teachers have influenced students; upperclassmen have influenced lower classmen." Calling this a "trickle-down phenomenon," the authors seem to have correctly analyzed how LSD got around the country. They left out only one vital element, which they had no way of knowing: That somebody had to influence the teachers and that up there at the top of the LSD distribution system could be found the men of MKULTRA.

Fremont-Smith and Abramson were the links between the universities and MKULTRA.

Fremont-Smith organized the conferences that spread the word about LSD to the academic hinterlands. Abramson also gave Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead's former husband, his first LSD. In 1959 Bateson, in turn, helped arrange for a beat poet friend of his named Allen Ginsberg to take the drug at a research program located off the Stanford campus.

And Murray was part of this drug-testing pyramid. During this time, according to Frank Barron, he had supervised experiments "on the subjective effects of psycho-active drugs, injecting adrenaline ... into naive subjects to study changes in their subjectivity." And in 1960, even as the "Multiform Assessments" on Kaczynski and his classmates were underway, Murray had, according to Leary, given his blessing to the latter's testing psilocybin, an hallucinogen derived from mushrooms, on undergraduates.
In his autobiography, *Flashbacks*, Leary, who would dedicate the rest of his life to “turning on and tuning out,” described Murray as “the wizard of personality assessment who, as OSS chief psychologist, had monitored military experiments on brainwashing and sodium amytal interrogation. Murray expressed great interest in our drug-research project and offered his support.”

Leary had taken LSD for the first time at Harvard in 1959, where, traveling in Abramson’s orbit, he had attended Fremont-Smith’s Macy Foundation conferences on the drug. And Murray, write Lee and Shlain, “took a keen interest in Leary’s work. He volunteered for a psilocybin session, becoming one of the first of many faculty and graduate students to sample the mushroom pill under Leary’s guidance.”

By that time, Gregory Bateson was working at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Palo Alto, California. While he was introducing Allen Ginsberg to the drug, a colleague began testing it on Stanford undergraduates. One of these students was Ken Kesey, who would later write *One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest* and was soon to be immortalized by Tom Wolfe as a “Merry Prankster” and LSD missionary in *The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test*.

Meanwhile, Murray, already addicted to amphetamines, continued to flirt with hallucinogens. At Leary’s suggestion, according to a former colleague, he took psilocybin again, this time with Aldous Huxley and Ginsberg. He introduced Morgan to LSD. And in 1961 he spoke at the International Congress of Applied Psychology in Copenhagen, which, thanks to Leary and Huxley’s presence, turned into a virtual psychotropic circus. His talk there, wrote Forrest Robinson, featured “a highly literary rendering of a psilocybin ‘trip’ that he took with Timothy Leary a year earlier. . . . The newspapers described it as the report of a drug-induced vision,” he wrote [Lewis] Mumford, with obvious delight.”

Not all scientists worked for the CIA. And many did so unwittingly. Nor was this agency the only covert intelligence bureaucracy sponsoring Cold War studies. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and other defense agencies financed their own experiments as well, often duplicating each other’s efforts, sometimes at the same institutions. (The Harvard Medical School, for example, conducted LSD research on unwitting subjects for the Department of the Army in 1952–54, even as Hyde continued with similar work at Boston Psychopathic for the CIA.)

And although LSD may have been the most sensational subject, Lee and Shlain make clear that it was far from the only field in which the government was prime mover. Cold War research ran the gamut, from investigations of sleep deprivation to perfecting anthrax delivery systems. It co-opted nearly an entire generation of scholars in the physical, social, and health sciences. This work was so various, so widespread, and so secret that even today it is impossible to grasp its full dimensions.

Among MKULTRA papers that later came to light, Lee and Shlain write, were

- CIA documents describing experiments in sensory deprivation, sleep teaching, ESP, subliminal projection, electronic brain stimulation, and many other methods that might have applications for behavior modification. One project was designed to turn people into programmed assassins who would kill on automatic command. Another document mentioned “hypnotically-induced anxieties” and “induced pain as a form of physical and psychological control.” There were repeated references to exotic drugs and biological agents that caused “headache clusters,” uncontrollable twitching or drooling, or a lobotomy-like stupor. Deadly chemicals were concocted for the sole purpose of inducing a heart attack or cancer without leaving a clue as to the actual source of the disease. CIA specialists also studied the effects of magnetic fields, ultrasonic vibration, and other forms of radiant energy on the brain. As one CIA doctor put it, “We lived in a never-ever land of ‘eyes only’ memos and unceasing experimentation.”

As university professors and hospital researchers pursued their devil’s bargain with the intelligence community, victims accumulated. On January 8, 1953, Harold Blauer, a professional tennis player, reportedly died from a massive overdose of a mescaline derivative at the New York State Psychiatric Institute. The drug, say the investigative journalists H. P. Albarelli, Jr., and John Kelly, was administered “as part of a top-secret Army-funded experimental program . . . code named Project Pelican, in which Blauer was used as a guinea pig.” The supervisor of the project was Dr. Paul H. Hoch, director of experimental psychiatry and, according to Albarelli and Kelly, an associate of Harold Abramson’s.
Project Pelican, write Albarelli and Kelly, was part of a larger cooperative venture between the CIA and the army's Chemical Corps Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick, Maryland, called MK-NAOMI—reputedly named after Abramson's assistant, Naomi Busner. The project's purpose, according to CIA documents, was to develop biological weapons that could be used on "individuals for the purposes of affecting human behavior with the objectives ranging from very temporary minor disablement to more serious and longer incapacitation to death."

At the behest of the Chemical Corps, the New York Medical examiner conducted no autopsy of Blauer, kept the army's name out of its report, and described the death as an accidental overdose.

Eleven months later, the CIA claimed another victim. On November 28, 1953, a Fort Detrick biochemist fell—or was pushed—from a thirteenth-floor window of New York's Statler Hotel on Seventh Avenue, falling 170 feet to the sidewalk. He was still alive but trying to talk when the night manager, Armond Pastore, reached him, but died a few minutes later.

Frank Olson, a chemist and joint employee of the CIA and army Chemical Corps, had worked his entire professional life at Fort Detrick. An expert in germ warfare, during World War II he had designed clothing intended to protect Allied soldiers from possible German biological attacks during the Normandy invasion. In 1949 and 1950, he worked briefly on "Operation Mercurius," a joint US-British effort to spray virulent organisms—so-called BW antipersonnel agents—around the Caribbean, decimating untold thousands of plants and animals. At the time of his death, Olson was developing a new, portable, and more lethal form of anthrax that could be put into a small spray can.

By 1953, Olson was acting chief of Fort Detrick's Special Operations Division, which, according to a Michael Ignatieff article in the New York Times Magazine, had become "the center for the development of drugs for use in brainwashing and interrogation." But he was becoming increasingly disillusioned.

The turning point came during the summer of 1953. Olson had traveled to England and Germany to observe the use of mind-control drugs on collaborators and German SS prisoners considered "expendable." Some died. While in Europe, according to his son, Eric, Frank Olson also learned that the Americans were deploying Anthrax against enemy troops in Korea. When returning American POWs reported this—the first use of bacterial weapons by the United States in war—authorities in Washington dismissed their claims as products of brainwashing. Returning to America shaken, Olson resolved to quit.

On November 19, Gottlieb met with six MKULTRA personnel, including Olson, at Deep Creek Lodge in rural Maryland. The CIA would claim twenty-two years later that during the retreat, on Gottlieb's order, his deputy, Robert Lashbrook, spiked the after-dinner Cointreau with LSD. Olson and all but two of the others (one a teetotaler, the other abstaining because of a headcold) drank it. In fact, Eric Olson believes that only his father's drink was spiked, and that the substance he imbibed was probably not LSD but something stronger. In any case, soon, Olson was experiencing disorientation.

When he came home, his wife, Alice, found him withdrawn, saying repeatedly that he "had made a terrible mistake." The next day he told his supervisor, Vincent Ruwet, that he wanted to resign from the agency. But officials couldn't afford to let him leave. He knew too much. Once outside, he could be an acute embarrassment. So Ruwet and Lashbrook took Olson to New York, supposedly to see a psychiatrist. In fact, they brought him to Harold Abramson, who prescribed nembutal and bourbon.

According to the CIA, Ruwet and Lashbrook had earlier taken Olson to see John Mulholland, a magician hired by the CIA to advise on "the delivery of various materials to unwitting subjects"—i.e., on how to spike drinks with drugs or poisons. Olson was suspicious of Mulholland and asked Ruwet, "What's behind this? Give me the lowdown. What are they trying to do with me? . . . Just let me disappear."

That evening, Olson wandered the streets of New York, discarding his wallet and identification cards before returning to the Statler. And the next day, the CIA claims its experts decided Olson must be institutionalized. Yet he seemed to be feeling better. After he and Lashbrook ate a dreary Thanksgiving meal at a Horn & Hardart restaurant, the two men returned to their room at the Statler, which they shared, and Olson called Alice to say he "looked forward to seeing her the next day."

Around 2:00 A.M. the next morning, Pastore found Olson on the sidewalk. Olson tried to tell Pastore something, but his words were too faint and garbled to be understood. He died before the ambulance arrived. Immediately afterward, Pastore asked the hotel operator if she'd
overheard any calls from Room 1081A. Yes, she said, two. In one, someone from the room said, "He's gone," and the voice at the other end of the line said, "That's too bad."

The CIA hushed up Olson's death. The medical examiner made no mention of the CIA, did not do an autopsy, and ruled the death a suicide due to depression. The family didn't believe this story, as Olson had never seemed depressed until after the retreat at Deep Creek Lodge. Yet it would not be until 1975 that they would learn some of the circumstances of his death, and even then not apparently the whole story.

At the request of Frank Olson's son, Eric, an autopsy was performed in 1994, revealing that Olson had apparently been struck on the left side of the temple and knocked unconscious before going through the window. In 1998, the Manhattan District Attorney's office reclassified Olson's death "cause unknown."

With Olson's death, the culture of despair had come full circle. Having experienced what Ellen Herman called "a collapse of faith in the rational appeal and workability of democratic ideology and behavior," the generation of scholars that emerged from World War II had sought to perfect the tools of social control by which the elite would save democracy. Following the rubrics of positivism, they believed that good and evil are fictions. People aren't bad, merely sick. By curing them, psychologists can prevent war. All problems can be fixed by the alchemy of the mind sciences.

But a world in which morality has no meaning is one in which eventually everything is permitted. The same narrow focus on value-free science that led Nazi concentration camp doctors to commit atrocities encouraged many of these well-meaning scholars to cross ethical lines. By following a path of moral agnosticism, they reached a dead end. Rather than saving democracy, they created tools for coercion, and many people were hurt.

Murray was a product of these times, a man whose career and ideas embodied the development of his discipline and its role in American culture. Like other leading psychologists of his generation, he was a beneficiary of the Rockefeller Foundation's efforts to promote psychology in public policy. He was intensely patriotic and served on the Committee for National Morale. He flourished during World War II and he was a star in the OSS.

After the war, Murray's contributions to personality theory, including the TAT, personnel assessment, and techniques for analyzing foreign leaders and countries, became virtual Cold War institutions. Throughout this undeclared conflict he continued to serve, albeit quietly, America's defense efforts. And among the services he performed would be the experiments on Kaczynski and his cohort.

Even today, however, neither Murray's friends, his widow, nor even some historians believe this. Murray, they argue, was a world federalist who, in Herman's words, was "transformed into a militant pacifist and peace activist after the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

Their skepticism is understandable. It is rare when even spouses know of these connections. The CIA never reveals the identity of its "assets." Often the professor himself doesn't know the originating source of research monies he receives. And Murray made much of his supposed transformation into "peace activist" following Hiroshima.

Nevertheless, they are mistaken. Hiroshima did not convert Murray to world federalism. Even in 1943, during the same period when he was seeking combat duty in Europe, he wrote in his analysis of Hitler that "there is a great need now rather than later, for some form of World Federation" (Murray's italics).

Rather, like so many "nervous liberals" of his generation, Murray was both hawk and dove. He resembled his contemporary, Cord Meyer, the war hero and onetime president of United World Federalists, who eventually became a top officer in the CIA. Such ambivalence characterized virtually the entire elite clique of East Coast professionals to which he belonged. Theirs was a world in which everyone knew each other, and many worked for the CIA. Murray was so surrounded by agency people he couldn't have moved without bumping into one.

In fact, as we have seen, Murray was indeed a Cold War warrior—not, perhaps, as prominent a player as some, but a player nonetheless. He received steady funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, which had served as cover for his trip with Cantril to the Soviet Union for the CIA in 1958, and from the National Institute of Mental Health, also
known to be a covert funding conduit. He apparently worked for Hum-RRo. He served as an adviser on army-sponsored steroid experiments. He helped found Harvard's Social Relations Department, which had been generously funded by covert intelligence agencies. He served the U.S. Army Surgeon General's Clinical Psychology Advisory Board and the National Committee for Mental Hygiene with the CIA's propagator of LSD, Frank Fremont-Smith. Along with Fremont-Smith, Abramson, and Leary, he occupied a spot on the agency’s LSD pyramid.

And in 1959, Murray would cap off a long and distinguished career with the last of a series of studies inspired by his OSS assessments and originally undertaken for the U.S. Navy Department. And Ted Kaczynski would participate.

I found the experience devastating . . .

—Former undergraduate participant in deceptive psychological experiment at another college

After breaking off my participation in a state of extreme anger (including a highly elevated heart rate), I met with [Stanley] Milgram on several occasions . . . arguing that the methods were totally unacceptable.

—HERBERT I. WINER,
thirty-eight years after participating in the Milgram experiment while a Yale professor

In 1948, Henry Murray wrote the Rockefeller Foundation requesting support, in part for "development of a system of procedures for testing the suitability of officer candidates for the navy." He was
awarded the grant. After some delays, research commenced in 1949. This would be the first of four such studies, each three years in length, conducted after the war on selected Harvard students. Eventually, they, along with a more rudimentary version first launched in 1941, would be called “Multiform Assessments of Personality Development Among Gifted College Men.” All postwar efforts focused on stressful dyadic confrontations akin to those mock interrogations Murray had helped to orchestrate for the OSS.

Kaczynski’s was the last and most complex of these, involving, Murray claimed, “over 1,000 variables.” At its conclusion, he would retire. It was, one might say, his last hurrah, embodying all that he was: his brilliance, narcissism, charm, creativity, snobbery, patriotism, energy, idealism, sadism, love for Christiana, testy relations with assistants and colleagues, desire to perfect the human personality, susceptibility to writer’s block, and the inability to decide whether he was a humanist, physician, or scientist. And virtually every one of these traits would touch, directly or indirectly, the twenty-two undergraduate study subjects—especially those, like Kaczynski, who were particularly vulnerable.

Indeed, in their essays, test answers, and interviews at the outset of the experiment, many of these young men exhibited attitudes of anger, nihilism, and alienation—reflecting, perhaps, just how pervasively the culture of despair had already affected them.

“Bulwer” admitted that “right now I have sort of a nihilistic outlook on life. . . . How do you justify studying if you regard yourself as an ant crawling through a great huge anthill with millions of others?”

“Ives,” speaking of living a conventional life, confessed:

And for doing all this I will hate myself. I mourn the world in which I live because for me there is no place unless I compromise. All I can do is gather up the shattered remains of my hope and love and in the debris of the world keep at least one small blaze of poetry burning. . . . I most feel akin to . . . the artists and the philosophers and have a hatred for the scientists. The scientists I hate because they are pursuing goals which are destined to remove man even further from himself.

“Naisfield” averred, “I don’t feel that there is any purpose in my being alive. . . .”

To describe his philosophy of life, “Oscar” claimed to quote Bertrand Russell (whose writings were assigned in Gen Ed): “Only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.”

“Quartz” announced that there were “no such things as objective values.”

“Dorset” wrote simply, “Society as I see it stinks.”

“Sanwick,” as one researcher put it, is “basically distrustful of the whole enterprise of life.” Researchers found analyzing him “almost impossible,” because “his whole life is conceptualized within a bombastic framework of philosophical concepts: being, life, death, transcendency, preservation, liberation, repetition, chaos. . . . One feels . . . a great tumult and chaos of awarenesses, perceptions, and feelings.”

And so on. Another (not Kaczynski) was deemed to be “a young man in a state of considerable distress, depression, and confusion . . . extremely alienated,” and still another as prone to “withdrawal, silence.”

Such thoughts were bound to magnify the impact of the dyadic proceeding. And indeed, the experiment clearly affected some profoundly. According to a source on Kaczynski’s defense team, more than one of the subjects experienced emotional problems afterward. And their responses to questionnaires sent after the project ended confirm that certain students found the experience searing. Even twenty-five years later, several recalled the unpleasantness.

In 1987, “Cringle” remembered the “anger and embarrassment . . . the glass partition . . . the electrodes and wires running up our sleeves.”

“Twenty-five years later, “Drill” still had “very vivid general memories of the experience. . . . I remember someone putting electrodes and blood pressure counter on my arm just before the filming. . . . [I] was startled by [his interlocutor’s] venom. . . . I remember responding with unabating rage.”

What “Flange” remembered most vividly was being “attacked” and hating “having all my movements and sounds recorded . . . we were led over to the chairs and strapped in and as the wires were attached to us . . . I began to get more involved in the situation and I began to realize
objectively, the long-term effects of such deceit on participants. Indeed, not many will even discuss the subject. When I raised it, most responded, “Those are good questions,” then terminated the conversation. The research community, as one explained, “is afraid what it might find out.”

Some defenders of the practice point to Stanley Milgram’s follow-up questionnaire, which reported that 84 percent experienced no untoward effects. Some cite a handful of other such retrospective studies, which on average suggest that “only” around 20 percent of participants in deceptive research were harmed by it. According to the most cited survey of this kind—a questionnaire administered to 195 former participants in deceptive research—“only” fifty-six people, or 29 percent, say they suffered.

And this “low” percentage, say these apologists, justifies the dishonesty. If a majority remains unharmed, they conclude, deceit is justified.

Such is the bizarre reasoning that passes for ethics in contemporary psychological research. Fortunately, not everyone feels this way. “The harm the minority of subjects report they have suffered,” writes Diana Baumrind, a research psychologist at the University of California, Berkeley, and one of the few critics of the practice, “is not nullified by the majority of subjects who claim to have escaped unscathed, any more than the harm done victims of drunk drivers can be excused by the disproportionate number of pedestrians with sufficient alacrity to avoid being run over by them.”

Moreover, Baumrind notes, the self-reporting questionnaires typically used to collect this data are notoriously unreliable because the most alienated might not respond at all or be reluctant to offend the experimenter by admitting they had been harmed. “It takes well-trained clinical interviewers to uncover true feelings of anger, shame, or altered self-image in participants who believe that what they say should conform with their image of a ‘good subject.’”

“My own belief,” Baumrind explains, “... is that subjects are less adversely affected by physical pain or stress than they are by experiences that result in loss of trust in themselves and the investigator and, by extension, in the meaningfulness of life itself. College students, who are the most frequently used subject pool, are particularly susceptible to conditions that produce an experience of anomic.”

Such experiments, she goes on, can “impair his or her ability to endow activities and relationships with meaning,” “reduce trust in legitimate authority,” and “impair the individual’s sense of self-esteem and personal integrity.”

Several surveys confirm that deceitful experiments sow distrust. According to a 1972 summary of such research, one found that “deception led to increased suspiciousness.” Another that “deceived and debriefed subjects were ‘less inclined to trust experiments to tell the truth.’” Still others have noted that “deception ... increases negative behavior.”

One person whose self-esteem was profoundly undermined by apparently innocuous deceptive research was Baumrind's own former secretary. “I found the experience devastating,” the secretary wrote later.

I was harmed in an area of my thinking which was central to my personal development at that time. Many of us who volunteered for the experiment were hoping to learn something about ourselves that would help us to gauge our own strengths and weaknesses, and formulate rules for living that took them into account. When, instead, I learned that I did not have any trustworthy way of knowing myself—or anything else—and hence could have no confidence in any lifestyle I formed on the basis of my knowledge, I was not only disappointed, but felt that I had somehow been cheated into learning, not what I needed to learn, but something which stymied my very efforts to learn.

And it only takes one. Deceptive research is wrong even if no one is hurt, because lying is wrong. And if just a single individual suffers—or worse, is prompted to commit suicide or murder—then the research was doubly indefensible. Yet, in virtually every deceitful experiment, someone is harmed.

Could Kaczynski have been one?

Yale University professor Robert Levine, generally regarded as one of the world's leading experts on human subject experiments, thinks so. Although cautioning that his field is internal medicine and not psychology, he nevertheless confirmed to me that his “gut feeling” is that “such an experiment would prove traumatic to a subject who went into it
already psychologically unstable.” Paul Appelbaum, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts, concurs. “Could such experiments have a negative effect on vulnerable persons?” he asks rhetorically. “Since many forms of psychological trauma can lead to symptoms at a later point... it is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility.”

As we shall see, Kaczynski was especially vulnerable in precisely the ways Baumrind describes. Murray’s own analysis, which was obtained from sources other than the Murray Center, verified that Kaczynski had been more severely affected by the experiment than any of the other subjects.

The Dyad formed the nexus where Murray’s and Kaczynski’s lives intersected. Given the professor’s powerful personality and reported “contamination” of research through personal relations with students, it should not be surprising if he made a strong and negative impression on the boy.

It is hard to imagine two more different people: Kaczynski, the son of working-class Poles, and Murray, the scion of a rich and well-connected family. Murray did not hide his privileged background. He featured his ancestor, the 4th Earl of Dunmore, prominently on his curriculum vitae. He helped to finance the Harvard Psychological Clinic with his own funds, and it showed. One former colleague called him “the squire” and “ruler of a latifundial estate,” exhibiting “aristocratic demeanors.”

Murray was, commented Leopold Bellak, “a man of style, in living, not just writing... the understated elegance... he feels very much an aristocrat, makes me feel a plebeian and an unformed lout... Harry always struck me as a person with an aversion to the common people...”

Some of Kaczynski’s experimental cohort may have been charmed by this patrician demeanor. But to a boy of sixteen who had only two pair of trousers to his name, this suave New Yorker, who supervised these tests, who boasted aristocratic ancestry, who summered in the St. Lawrence, occasionally vacationed in the West Indies, and has been described as leaving friends “bleeding when he left,” must have seemed formidable indeed.

Kaczynski was acutely sensitive to snobbery. It is hard to imagine him at the Annex, sipping tea with graduates of Groton and enjoying the experience. In “Truth vs. Lies,” he reports on the pain he felt when an assistant of Murray’s snubbed him, apparently because “this man didn’t want to be seen socializing with someone who wasn’t dressed properly and wasn’t acceptable to the clique of which he was a member.” Anger at such perceived slights found fertile ground in Kaczynski, whose philosophy of life, as expressed in the essay Murray asked every student to write at the outset of the experiment, revealed him to be the most nihilistic of all the participants.

Murray had divided these essays into three categories. The first set expressed “vague or unformed philosophies”; the second, more developed ideas; and the third—the most mature of all—“generally formed or nearly formed philosophies containing statements on personal ideals, principles, goals which conceivably can be lived by.”

Within the first group, Murray wrote, some rejected the need for a philosophy of life. Others betrayed strong pessimism. Still others expressed only ill-formed opinions either because, he hypothesized, the student wasn’t interested in the exercise, or had never thought about the question, or didn’t want to cooperate, or rejected the whole idea of having a philosophy of life.

Murray consigned Kaczynski’s paper to the most solipsistic subset of this “vague or unformed” category—of “negative approaches to life which precluded any positive philosophy of life.” In these, Murray observed, “self-centeredness appears to be a common attribute.”

But Kaczynski’s opinions reflected more than mere egoism. They also revealed how thoroughly he had absorbed Gen Ed’s message of despair.

“I can’t find any objective basis for accepting any set of values, any philosophy, etc. rather than any other,” Kaczynski wrote.

If I say something "should be" or that a person "should be" this or that it is my own personal emotional reaction to the question; I don’t really see any reason why anything should be this way or that.
The most important parts of my philosophy: The desirability of competition and struggle. There is no morality or objective set of values. The importance of independence. We can know nothing for certain.

“There is no morality or objective set of values.” These words not only constitute a symptom of alienation. They also show that Kaczynski had learned his Harvard lessons well. He was merely expressing the positivist view of ethics—omnipresent in the curriculum—that philosophers call the “emotive theory.”

“The main contentions of the emotive theory,” the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains, “may be described ... as consisting of a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim ... is that ... ethical convictions can neither be demonstrated, like propositions of arithmetic, nor tested by observation or experiment ...” The positive claim is that “ethical terms function typically to express emotion ...”

Emotivism, in short, is nothing more than the view that only science matters, and that ethical opinions, being mere emotional utterances. It was a recurring theme that students of the period encountered every day, at lectures, bull sessions, and in assigned reading.

Some first met it in Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic, a book frequently assigned in introductory philosophy courses. An ethical judgment, Ayer announced, “is purely ‘emotive.’ It is used to express feeling about certain objects, but not to make any assertion about them ... Sentences which simply express moral judgements do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling.”

Some were introduced to it by the author of the emotive theory himself, Charles L. Stevenson, who explained that “the sentence, 'X is good,' means 'we like X.'” And some learned it from a freshman Gen Ed English composition sourcebook, Toward Liberal Education, in which a contributor advises that to use “words implying moral judgments in the course of argument is very generally an attempt to distort the hearer's view of the truth by arousing emotions.”

Kaczynski, therefore, was clearly vulnerable. While the results of the TAT test rated him as sane at the outset of the experiment, given this social insecurity and philosophic nihilism, the Murray experiment was bound to affect him badly. And it did. The research team's own analysis of student reactions to the Dyad—in which their philosophies of life were attacked by the interrogator (whom Murray called “the Alter”)—rated Kaczynski's as the most extreme, by every measure.

“Lawful,” the team found, scored highest in the three categories: (1) “Intensity of Criticism in Alter's Philosophy”; (2) “Intensity and frequency of criticism of Alter's Philosophy”; and (3) “Rank Order of Dissension in the Dyad.” In other words, Kaczynski had the most traumatic experience of all. In his own handwriting next to “Lawful’s” scores, Murray scrawled: “Overt expressions of Low Evaluations. Lawful—low, underlying resentment and contempt.”

As Kaczynski’s college life continued, outwardly he seemed to be adjusting to Harvard. By the end of his junior year, John Finley, the Eliot housemaster, would write with characteristic condescension that Kaczynski’s midyear performance of three As and a B begin to justify the curious act of imagination that got him here. He turned nineteen only at the end of May and has had to overcome both youth and simple upbringing. His excellent and mounting marks reveal high inner strength; he should begin to find himself fully in graduate school. All very gallant, touching, and memorable.

But while Finley was speaking of Kaczynski’s “high inner strength,” inwardly the student began to worry about his health. He slept fitfully and started having terrible nightmares. Like Nietzsche, Kaczynski began to feel like “one of those machines that sometimes explode. The intensity of my emotions makes me tremble.” As he told Sally Johnson later, he started having fantasies of revenge against a society that he increasingly perceived as evil and obsessed with enforcing conformism through psychological controls.

These daydreams upset him all the more because they exposed his own ineffectuality. He would become horribly angry with himself because he could not express this fury openly. “I never attempted to put
against foreign oppressors. They all have long memories: Al Qaeda seeks to avenge what it views as acts of Western imperialism dating back to the Crusades. The IRA hasn’t forgotten centuries of English occupation. South American guerrillas seek to undo Cortés and Pizarro’s sixteenth-century conquests of Mexico and Peru.

There are indeed distinctions to be made among these philosophies. Some claim to fight for national liberation or an interpretation of the Koran, Bible, or the U.S. Constitution, others for anarchism, Marxism, animals, or the environment. But there is one idea they all share: hatred of modernity. They all endorse, in one form or another, what Arthur Lovejoy and George Boas called “cultural primitivism” and described as “the discontent of the civilized with civilization, or with some conspicuous and characteristic feature of it.”

Call it the crisis of modernism. What began as an academic problem—a loss of confidence in ancient Western notions about reason—has transmogrified into a vast political assault on contemporary civilization. “Industrialism is a system, an entire, inescapable net of social organization,” writes an editorialist in the February 16, 1998, “Industrial Civilization Collapse” issue of the radical environmentalist paper, Live Wild or Die! “The Machine is, or soon will be, everywhere. . . . It is the industrial empire—its technological, mechanical, political, social, psychological and economic apparatus combined into a unified operation, the Machine—that is responsible for the state of the planet and our daily living conditions. . . . So don’t recycle this paper, use it to start a sawmill on fire!”

“I tell you, freedom and human rights in America are doomed,” Osama bin Laden prophesied in a television interview. “The U.S. government will lead the American people—and the West in general—into an unbearable hell and a choking life.”

These people, like Kaczynski, feel threatened by civilization. They despise the contemporary nation-state, which they see as big, repressive, and unresponsive to the needs of people. In response, they would destroy everything. And they perceive the enemy not merely as governments but as entire societies. So, in their eyes, everyone is fair game. As bin Laden put it, there is no “differential between those dressed in military uniforms and civilians. They are all targets in this fatwa.”

The real story of Ted Kaczynski and contemporary terrorism is one of the nature of modern evil—evil that results from the corrosive powers of intellect itself, and its arrogant tendency to put ideas above common humanity. It stems from our capacity to conceive theories or philosophies that promote violence or murder in order to avert supposed injustices or catastrophes, to acquiesce to historical necessity, or to find the final solution to the world’s problems—and by this process of abstraction to dehumanize our enemies.

Mass and indiscriminate murder is the crime of educated people, not because they are worse than others but because intelligence leads some to commit hubris, the sin of intellectual pride. It seduces them into believing that they have a right to decide what is best for others. It prompts them to ignore Immanuel Kant’s advice—to “treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”—and instead tempts them to view others as merely the means to fulfillment of theories.

And although the vast majority of educated people never turn to crime, history reveals that intellect is, indeed, a prerequisite for accomplishing mass murder. During the twentieth century, movements founded or led by intellectuals killed nearly 200 million people. General Tōjō Hideki, whose Japanese regime murdered an estimated 15 million, mostly Chinese, graduated at the top of his class at the Imperial Army Staff College and headed the military’s so-called Control Faction, an association of officers promoting technological modernization.

The Nazi Party, responsible for the death of over 40 million, was conceived and led by Germany’s best and brightest: IQ tests given their leaders on trial at Nuremberg after the war ranked the most senior leadership—including Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, and race theorist Alfred Rosenberg—in the 90th percentile, in other words, higher than nine out of ten people. The concentration camp doctors who performed sadistic experiments on inmates were educated men, devoted to science.

All twentieth-century Communist movements—which collectively murdered 100 million souls, according to the Black Book of Communism, a compilation of their crimes by leading French scholars—were